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COMMENT
Buying an Audience: Justifying the Regulation of
Campaign Expenditures that Buy Access to Voters
This Comment suggests a new constitutional approach to the regulation of
political expenditures. The approach pushes beyond the question of whether
political expenditures are more like "speech" or more like "property"' and
instead focuses on which types of expenditures fit into each category. Some
expenditures, but not all, are necessary to create speech. These "speech-
enabling" expenditures cannot be meaningfully disentangled from the
communication they make possible. Other expenditures, however, provide
something of value aside from the speech itself as an incentive for individuals
to listen to the speech. The classic example is expenditures on advertising,
which reach listeners or viewers because they wish to consume the content
with which the advertising is packaged. These "audience-buying" expenditures
function as property and consequently deserve less protection. Courts should
uphold campaign finance regulations that are closely tailored to protecting
speech-enabling expenditures while regulating audience-buying expenditures
in order to enhance political equality.
Individuals and organizations with access to financial resources to buy
advertising can offer audiences an attractive exchange: viewers need not pay for
television programs they wish to watch because they also watch the
commercials packaged along with them. Advertisers usually do not pay their
audience directly, but instead pay intermediary media organizations, which in
turn offer audiences content they value. Though indirect, this method of
providing an incentive is functionally the same as offering a DVD with
entertaining content or anything else the audience values as an incentive to
view the advertisement. Unlike those who can afford to advertise, those with
fewer resources can reach only those who are interested in receiving their
1. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2ooo) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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message without such an additional incentive. They can earn an audience, but
not buy one.
This Comment accepts the need for incentives to encourage the public to
tune in to a larger number or greater variety of political messages than they
otherwise would. It suggests, however, that courts should give the legislative
branch leeway to design regulatory frameworks for such incentives -
frameworks that would enhance political equality without compromising the
First Amendment's core protection of expenditures necessary to engage in
political speech.
Without advocating that all messages should receive equal attention
regardless of their relative value, popularity, or speakers' intensity of feeling,
campaign finance reform proponents rightly suggest that government
intervention regarding political expenditures is necessary to preserve political
equality.' These advocates generally fail, however, to distinguish among
different kinds of political expenditures. They therefore present proposals that
inevitably require difficult tradeoffs among the constitutional interests in
individual autonomy, robust debate, and political equality. Reformers can
reduce the tension between these interests by exempting from new regulation
speech-enabling expenditures required for basic acts of expression and
focusing instead on reducing the political inequality produced by unequal
ability to expend money on buying an audience.
I. PAST ATTEMPTS TO BALANCE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS IN
CAMPAIGN FINANCE DECISIONS
From the moment the Supreme Court struck down campaign expenditure
limits in Buckley v. Valeo3 to today, judicial opinions and academic scholarship
have criticized Buckley for equating money with speech.4 This critique has not
persuaded a majority of the Court, which in several recent decisions has
continued to apply strict scrutiny to campaign finance regulations on First
Amendment grounds.' Indeed, few reformers would defend the proposition
that political expenditures and First Amendment rights are totally unrelated.
Unless reformers are willing to defend the constitutionality of a law limiting a
a. See infra Part II.
3. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
4. E.g., Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring); J. Skelly Wright,
Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. lOOl (1976).
5. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 127 S. Ct.
2652 (2007); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248 (2006).
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campaign's total expenditures to a single dollar, they must come up with a
principled basis for distinguishing expenditures that deserve First Amendment
protections from those that do not.
In the absence of such a principle for distinguishing between expenditures
that should be treated as property and expenditures that should be treated as
speech, the Court has created odd compromises among the "competing
constitutionally protected interests" 6 of free speech, equality, and democracy.
After Buckley held that contribution limits burden constitutional interests less
severely than total expenditure limits, the Supreme Court has tended to focus
on the form and level of regulation instead of the nature of the expenditures
that would be regulated. The Court inquires into whether expenditures are
made in coordination with campaigns or independently7 and whether
contribution limits are high enough for "effective campaigning" or are "too low
and too strict."' 8 These distinctions seem artificial because the questions of who
contributes or spends money and in what amounts seem tangential to the
question of whether the spending impinges on fundamental rights or
democratic values. 9
The Supreme Court's most recent major campaign finance cases, Randall v.
Sorrell,10 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 1 and FEC v. Davis,2
demonstrate that these artificial distinctions are unstable and are beginning to
erode. Prior to these cases, the Supreme Court had never found any
contribution limits to be "too low"; it had rejected a facial challenge to the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act's (BCRA) limitation on "electioneering
communications" by independent groups; and it had given Congress
significant latitude to offer incentives for candidates to accept public funding.13
In Randall, however, the plurality struck down Vermont's contribution limits
for placing too heavy a burden on society's interest in competitive and
adequately funded elections. 14 In WRTL, the Court held that independently
6. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).
7. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 615-16 (1996).
8. Randall, 548 U.S. at 248.
9. See, e.g., Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. at 414-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1o. 548 U.S. at 248.
11. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
12. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (20o8).
13. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 190-94 (2003).
14. 548 U.S. at 261 ("[T]he Act burdens First Amendment interests by threatening to inhibit
effective advocacy by those who seek election, particularly challengers; its contribution
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run political advertisements that were not the "functional equivalent of express
advocacy"-a category it defined narrowly-were exempt from BCRA's
limitations.'" In Davis, the Court struck down the "Millionaire's Amendment,"
which raised contribution limits for opponents of self-financing candidates,
holding that the law would "impermissibly burden" the self-financing
candidate's First Amendment rights.16 While the Court has not yet accepted
Justice Thomas's libertarian view of the First Amendment in campaign
finance,1 7 these cases have significantly narrowed the possibilities for
meaningful campaign finance regulation."8 In the wake of these decisions,
campaign finance reformers must identify a new method for distinguishing
between protected expenditures and expenditures that can be regulated.
Without such a method, unregulated expenditures by independent groups
could quickly overtake regulated spending by candidates,19 even if the public
financing system is significantly improved.
II. RECONCILING POLITICAL EQUALITY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The debate over campaign finance regulation often centers on two
important constitutional disputes. First, campaign finance reforms are often
justified as necessary to enhance political equality,"0 which despite the absence
limits mute the voice of political parties; they hamper participation in campaigns through
volunteer activities .... ").
15. 127 S. Ct. at 2667 (applying the category "only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate").
16. 128 S. Ct. at 2771.
17. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 418 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that contribution limits are, like expenditure limits, objectionable because, "[b]y depriving
donors of their right to speak through the candidate ... [they) relegate donors' points of
view to less effective modes of communication").
18. Eliza Newlin Carney, Campaign Finance Laws Under Siege: In a Series of Recent Cases, The
Roberts Court Has Favored Deregulation, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM, July 28, 20o8,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/rg_20o8o728-5842.php.
19. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667 (holding that such expenditures cannot be limited if they stop
short of the "functional equivalent of express advocacy").
2o. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYREs, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMVAIGN FINANCE 13 (2002); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996)
(advocating "egalitarian pluralism" in which "each person has roughly equal political capital
regardless of preexisting disparities in wealth, education, celebrity, ability, or other
attributes"); Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign
Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 599, 6oo, 642-57; David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality
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of explicit constitutional language, the Supreme Court has acknowledged as a
"fundamental principle of representative government in this country."2'
Proponents of reform argue that because one purpose of politics is to contest
how much economic equality we will tolerate in our society, existing economic
inequalities cannot play too great a role in politics. 2 Allowing individuals who
have more resources to pay their fellow citizens for the opportunity to persuade
them gives these individuals just such an advantage.
Second, reformers generally acknowledge that political equality is in
tension with a view of the First Amendment that requires completely
unfettered political expenditures, 3 but dispute whether that is the proper
interpretation of the First Amendment. They advance a collectivist, listener-
focused conception of the First Amendment advocated by Alexander
Meiklejohn. 4 This collectivist conception finds the First Amendment's purpose
not in "individual self-actualization, but rather the preservation of democracy
... as a means or instrument of collective self-determination" that "allows
people to vote intelligently and freely, aware of all the options and in
possession of all the relevant information."2 This view contrasts markedly with
a conception of the First Amendment that focuses on individual autonomy and
emphasizes the role speaking plays in providing democratic legitimacy by
giving citizens a feeling of "authorship" in collective decisionmaking and the
and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1369, 1369-70, 1382-83 (1994); Cass
Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1392
(1994).
21. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56o-61 (1964).
22. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 20, at 13 ("If the deliberations of democratic citizens are
crucial in the legitimation of market inequality, we cannot allow market inequalities to have
an overwhelming impact on these deliberations."); Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-
Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1204, 1204 (1994)
(arguing that "permitting wealthy citizens to use their wealth in electoral politics biases the
electoral process in favor of their political objectives" and contradicts the premise "that the
electoral process should not be affected by whatever distribution of wealth exists in society
at election time").
23. For a defense of such a view, see BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001).
24. Meiklejohn argues that the First Amendment protects speech not for the benefit of speakers,
but to ensure listeners' access to information and argument so that they can engage in the
"voting of wise decisions." ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 25 (1948).
25. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowAL. REv. 1405, 1409-10 (1986).
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"warranted conviction that they are engaged in the process of determining their
own fate.,2
6
This Comment does not attempt to resolve either of these theoretical
disputes among competing constitutional priorities. Instead, it advocates an
approach that acknowledges the importance of each. Regulating expenditures
that buy an audience while exempting speech-enabling expenditures would
allow reformers to promote political equality while maintaining open access to
information and minimizing encroachments on individuals' autonomy and
feeling of authorship in collective decisionmaking.
To understand why, it will be helpful to investigate how this theoretical
dispute plays out in the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence.
Beginning with Buckley's famous rejection of equality as adequate grounds for
campaign finance regulation,27 the Court has viewed political expenditures as a
means for disseminating ideas and ensuring "unfettered" discourse, stating
that the First Amendment "was designed to secure the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" and "to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas. '', 8 The Court did not address, and
perhaps did not imagine, the possibility that campaign finance regulations
could be designed to allow unlimited "dissemination" and "interchange" of
ideas to those interested in hearing them, while equalizing only expenditures
that buy an audience of less interested listeners as well. More recently, in
Randall v. Sorrell, opponents of campaign finance limits demonstrated an
understanding that their claims are strongest when applied to expenditures
required to enable acts of speech or association. They focused their
arguments - with much success - on exactly such uses of money, arguing that
Vermont's expenditure limits are an unprecedented, direct restraint on
candidate speech. Once these low expenditure limits are exhausted, a
candidate may not drive to the village green to address a rally, may not
return the phone call from a reporter at the local newspaper, and may
not call a neighbor to urge her to get out to vote. This Court has never
26. Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517,
1523-24 (1997) (reviewing OWEN Fiss, LIBERALISM DIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE
MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996)); see Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1111-13 (1993).
27. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (stating that the First Amendment prevents
government from restricting "the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others").
28. Id. at 49 (citations omitted).
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allowed the government to prohibit candidates from communicating
this sort of relevant information during a campaign. 9
The plaintiffs convinced the Court to strike down limits on how much
campaigns can spend-on advertising, administrative costs, or other large
expenses -by focusing on the much tinier expenditures citizens must make to
be able to participate politically, such as payments for a phone call, a postage
stamp, or the fuel to attend a rally. Money does indeed fuel citizens' efforts to
participate in politics in all of the small ways that reform opponents cited. But
regulations need not limit that participation in order to address advertising
expenditures, which continue to comprise a large proportion of campaign
spending" and contribute significantly to political inequality.
Campaign finance reformers should find a way to accommodate the
Court's hostility to regulations that limit the core political acts of speaking,
listening, or associating,3' while honing in on advertisement expenditures,
which indirectly implicate First Amendment interests but are not necessary for
the speech to exist. By exempting expenditures needed to effectuate First
Amendment activity-staff, polling, or other media production costs, for
example- reformers will take the most difficult conflicts, in which
guaranteeing political equality arguably would infringe on core First
Amendment activities, off the table. Campaign regulations that instead
exclusively target paid advertising would ameliorate First Amendment
concerns and enhance citizens' opportunities to participate meaningfully and
equally in politics in a manner that more appropriately balances constitutional
interests. Perhaps such compromise would also make the reforms more likely
to survive Supreme Court review.
III. BUYING AN AUDIENCE
The practice of buying an audience is not an invention rooted solely in the
modern media age. As long as people have provided food or other free gifts at
29. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 320 (2006) (No. 04-1528).
30. OpenSecrets.org Center for Responsive Politics, Presidential Expenditures,
http://www.opensecrets.org/preso8/expenditures.php?cycle=20o8 (last visited Oct. 17,
2008) (calculating media expenditures at more than one-third of total expenditures in the
2008 presidential campaign cycle).
31. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L.
REv. 2353, 2373 (2000) (arguing that courts give priority to the speaker-focused,
participatory theory of democracy and therefore "will not implement the doctrinal
implications of other theories when they are inconsistent with the participatory approach"):
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events (from political meetings to promotions of time-share condominiums),
they have been offering extrinsic incentives for others to listen to their speech.
The evolution of the Internet and other technologies, however, have
dramatically reduced the cost of creating messages in various media and
distributing the message to nearly everyone who might wish to receive it. Once
someone signs up for an organization's e-mail list or regularly reads its
website, the marginal cost of reaching that person is small or nonexistent.
Although there is not yet a public access television channel for every candidate
or interest group to broadcast its message for free, there is YouTube.32
Barring individuals from making the relatively modest expenditures
necessary to create a message and make it accessible to others on YouTube, a
public access channel, or their own website would certainly infringe core First
Amendment interests. On the other hand, when speakers choose to pay to
place their message as an advertisement on other websites, where people will
view it as a byproduct of their interest in those websites' other content, that
additional expenditure provides an incentive external to the value the audience
believes the message itself holds.33 Such an additional expenditure is not a
necessary predicate of the speech. For that reason, legislators should be given
leeway to strike a different balance when regulating paid advertising.
IV. BUYING AN AUDIENCE VIOLATES DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES
Elected leaders are, at least in some ways, agents of voters. As a result, these
leaders' decisions to sell access to those seeking to influence them violate their
proper role and betray the public trust. This principal-agent problem may
appear to be inapplicable to voters, who presumably can represent their own
interests when deciding what incentives to accept, which messages to listen to,
and how to vote. If decisions are compromised because voters accept bribes to
32. Technological innovation has a dramatic potential to enhance the ability of individuals or
organizations with minimal resources to create and disseminate speech. No matter how
great the proliferation of blogs, video-sharing websites, and other forms of media, however,
any inequality in the ability of speakers to buy an audience that persists will continue to
affect political discourse, both on the Internet and in traditional media.
33. It is not always possible to distinguish perfectly whether a particular expenditure is "speech-
enabling" or "buys an audience." Hiring a talented actor for one's commercial may increase
the message's effectiveness because the actor explains the idea more clearly or because
viewers are less likely to change the channel as they believe the actor will make the
commercial entertaining, even if they doubt they will find the message worthwhile.
Legislatures need not define the exact contours of the grey areas to pass regulations that
target areas clearly outside of it, particularly those aimed at the price of placing an
advertisement after it is created.
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hear particular messages that might bias their decisions, a libertarian might
argue, then we should allow voters to decide whether the value of the bribe is
great enough to offset the effects of that bias.
This libertarian argument should be rejected because a vote is not solely an
instrument for serving a voter's own interests. Our laws against vote buying
demonstrate that the right to vote is not a license to do with one's vote
whatever one might choose.34 Voters should not be allowed to abrogate their
duty to help determine what is best for the populace, even if they would like to
do so in exchange for some private benefit. As Pamela Karlan explains,
[T]he right to vote is not given to an individual solely for his or her
own benefit. And if voting is in part a delegation of power from the
community, as well as a mechanism for delegating popular sovereignty
to public officials, then prohibiting voters from selling their votes
resembles prohibiting officials from selling their offices. Voters also
occupy a position of public trust, and their votes are thus not simply
theirs to sell."
If voters serve as agents for one another, then allowing others to buy access to
them is just as problematic as allowing them to buy access to legislators.
Reform skeptics, such as Kathleen M. Sullivan, question whether "political
finance sufficiently resembles voting as to be regulable by the equality norms
that govern voting" or if, as the Buckley Court analogized, "political finance
more resembles political speech than voting. '' , 6 In support of the second view,
Sullivan argues that "speakers generally have equal rights to be free of
government censorship, but not to command the attention of other
listeners.... [L]egislative restrictions on political speech may not be
predicated on the ground that the political speaker will have too great a
communicative impact. '37 It is certainly true that speakers do not have equal
rights to "command the attention of listeners," if that phrase implies that
listeners must give all speakers or all ideas equal attention, regardless of merit.
Speakers should, however, have equally limited ability to purchase the
34- See Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1325 (2000).
35. Pamela S. Karlan, Not by Money but by Virtue Won? Vote Trafficking and the Voting Rights
System, 8o VA. L. REv. 1455, 1466 (1994).
36. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 663, 672
(1997).
37. Id. at 673.
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attention of listeners when those listeners do not believe a speaker's message
itself is worthy of their attention.
Given this understanding of the role of voters, political advertising is
different from typical advertising for consumer products, which is more loosely
regulated, in one key respect. Advertisements for consumer products may lead
individuals to make poor consumer choices, but we permit them to make their
own decisions in this context. When individuals consume media with political
advertising, however, they receive all of the benefits, but few of the costs. If the
"bribe" of free content causes them to consume messages that are less reliable,
relevant, or unbiased than they otherwise would, the resulting harm to their
decision-making abilities is a public harm that spreads beyond their own
personal welfare. Unregulated political advertising, therefore, provides
individuals with disproportionate incentives to listen and respond politically to
those who have succeeded in the economic marketplace, irrespective of whether
they would otherwise find it worthwhile to give their arguments a hearing. If
the negative externalities of a polluting industry justify governmental
intervention, so too do the effects of allowing potential voters to sell their
attention to the speakers who can pay the largest bribe.
In comparison to expenditures that enable speech, expenditures that buy an
audience should be regulated more stringently. There is widespread concern
over the problematic practice of using campaign donations or gifts to "buy
access" to elected leaders." If those advocating one side of an issue have greater
access to public officials, as those who make larger contributions generally
do,39 this additional access increases their potential to influence legislative
outcomes.4" While legal regulations already partially restrict those who might
38. See, e.g., Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation ofBusiness and State, 95 CAL. L. REv. 2353, 2362
(2007); Gajan Retnasaba, Do Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Corrupt? Evidence from
Public Finance, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 145, 161 (2006) (arguing that "charging for access is in
itself a form of corruption," because "[s]electively awarding or denying access to the ear of
government on the basis of payments is surely a misuse of public office for private gain");
see also Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. io-81, 121 Stat.
735 (strengthening the federal bans on gifts, meals, and travel financed by lobbyists in
response to the concerns heightened by various lobbyist-related scandals).
39. Laura I. Langbein, Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence, 48 J. POL. 1052 (1986)
(finding that congressional representatives tended to spend more time with larger campaign
contributors, holding other statistical variables constant).
4o. Empirical studies have shown that there is some evidence that contributions affect legislative
outcomes. See, e.g., Richard L. Hall, Equalizing Expenditures in Congressional Campaigns: A
Proposal, 6 ELECTION L.J. 145, 16o (2007) ("(A] little access can go a long way, depending on
the group's lobbying strategy. Access often gives a group or individual or industry the
opportunity to subsidize the legislative effort of busy members on issues where member and
group have coincident interests."); Thomas Stratmann, Some Talk: Money in Politics. A
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wish to buy access to legislators, less attention has been devoted to the same
dynamic as it pertains to those who buy an audience with voters. If elected
leaders should get information from those they believe to be best informed or
most representative, rather than listening to those who pay them (or their
campaigns) the most, potential voters who elect those leaders should be seen as
having the same obligation.
Not all Americans will voluntarily tune in to C-SPAN. Providing incentives
to listen to political speech performs an important public function by
encouraging citizens who otherwise would tune out political debate to acquire
at least some knowledge relevant to their role as potential voters as a byproduct
of consuming other media content. The method for determining which
messages to subsidize and to what extent, however, must reflect our society's
bedrock principle of political equality. An approach to political expenditures
that allows those who control more resources to have more influence over the
extent to which various messages are subsidized violates this principle. Instead,
government structures should be established to supply these incentives, but on
a more equal basis, as befits a democracy in which all citizens are presumed to
be equally important.
CONCLUSION
Alexander Meiklejohn famously argued that the First Amendment's central
purpose was to ensure not that "everyone shall speak, but that everything
worth saying shall be said."'" This Comment has advocated a different ideal:
everyone shall be able to speak and to listen to speech they find worthwhile,
but everyone shall also have a more equal ability to pay to be heard. Limiting
citizens' ability to provide one another with incentives to hear political speech
does not violate the First Amendment or compromise individual autonomy as
long as citizens can decide what they will say and which speech they would like
to hear. Allowing citizens to direct some form of public subsidy to certain
(Partial) Review of the Literature, 124 PUB. CHOICE 135, 144, 146 (2005). Even the judgment of
medical experts, whose level of relevant education certainly exceeds that of the average
voter, can be affected by such techniques. See Michael G. Ziegler, Pauline Lew & Brian C.
Singer, The Accuracy of Drug Information from Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives, 273 JAMA
1296 (1995) (documenting that physicians are influenced by pharmaceutical company
seminars that promote particular medications, despite previous knowledge and
opportunities to obtain sponsor-free medical information).
41. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 24, at 25.
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ideas,42 in order to provide incentives to other citizens to hear ideas that they
might not have considered and that their fellow citizens think are important,
would also further democratic and egalitarian interests. This need for some
method of government subsidization, however, does not require that everyone
be free to put all of their money to any political use they desire. Instead, when
money is used to provide an incentive to attend to a particular political
message, rather than as the necessary means for creating a message or making
it accessible, the expenditure should be subject to regulation in the interest of
political equality.
ARI WEISBARD
42. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 20 (advancing the "Patriot Dollars" proposal);
Hasen, supra note 20, at 6.
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